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THE PRACTICAL IMPACTS OF
REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON
CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPERS AFTER THE
MORTGAGE CRISIS: A CASE STUDY
OF DOUBLE AA INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT GROUP, INC. V. SWIRE PACIFIC
HOLDINGS AND HOW ESCROW
REQUIREMENTS SHAPED FUTURE
FINANCING OF NEW CONDOMINIUM
CONSTRUCTION
Joshua A. Berman*
Jordan P. Sarason**
I.

INTRODUCTION

F

ederal involvement in securitized loans provided a buffer for
lenders to make increasingly risky loans for over seventy years. As
lenders took advantage of government protections, securitized loans—
the primary source of financing for real estate—were packaged
together into trusts and segmented by tranches, which were then
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assessed a risk factor by a rating agency, and sold together.1 By the
mid-1990s, Wall Street financiers were lending to middle-class
Americans through “exotic, untested financial products”2 that
ultimately led to the subprime mortgage crisis of the late 2000s.3
As lawmakers rushed to absolve themselves of blame, they
hurriedly passed legislation aimed at correcting those issues identified
as at the core of the subprime meltdown. While the mortgage crisis
was residential in nature, legislators and the courts also tried to
preempt a similar financial catastrophe from occurring in the
commercial markets by passing new laws and more strictly enforcing
existing laws. One such example of tighter judicial enforcement is
evident when analyzing cases stemming from the Florida
Condominium Act, specifically Section 718.202 of the Florida Statute
pertaining to sales or reservation deposits prior to closing.4
Section 718.202 was first passed in 1976.5 There have been
three instances of litigation originating out of the statute through
20086—ostensibly, when the mortgage crisis was realized—and there
have been an additional eight suits brought forth through the end of
2013. This heightened degree of judicial activism has addressed the
gamut of Section 718.202 issues: distinguishing special agents in
business and corporate law;7 purchase and sale refund questions
1

Alan Kronovet, An Overview of Commercial Mortgage Backed Securitization:
The Devil is in the Details, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 288, 289 (1997).
2
Christopher L. Peterson, Symposium, Subprime Meltdown: The Law and
Finance of the American Home Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 2008 Utah L. Rev.
1107, 1107 (2012).
3
Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 24 Rev. Financ. Stud. 1848 (2011).
4
Florida Condominium Act, Fla. Stat. § 718.202 (2011).
5
Double AA Int’l Inv. Group, Inc. v. Swire Pacific Holdings, 2010 WL
1258086 at 11 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
6
Barrack v. State, 462 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (defendant’s
conviction and sentence for crimes of theft of condominium deposits by prohibited
use was reversed and the information dismissed because the crime was nonexistent
and the charges against defendant under the statute were not properly worded);
Florida Communities Hutchinson Island v. Arabia, 452 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1984) (in an action for rescission of an agreement to purchase a
condominium unit which was not founded on a recorded instrument or mechanic’s
lien, the trial court had no authority to condition discharge of the notice of lis
pendens upon posting of a bond by the sellers); First Sarasota Service Corp. v.
Miller, 450 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (since the escrow agent had
prior written notice of a claim that there was a dispute between the purchasers and
the developer under Fla. stat. § 718.202(1)(d), it disbursed escrow funds at its peril).
7
In re Edgewater by the Bay, LLP, 419 B.R. 511 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
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following developer statutory violations;8 interpretation of escrow
requirements;9 and retrospective operation of escrow requirements.10
The thrust of some of these later cases can be traced to the
mortgage crisis. As the financial markets worsened, many real estate
investors lost their fortunes and sought opportunities for relief. In
2009, the U.S. Southern District Court of Florida provided the perfect
mechanism for these troubled investors to relieve themselves of
investments in new condominium projects in Double AA Int’l Inv.
Group, Inc. v. Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc.11 In her eighteen-page
opinion, Judge Cecilia Altonaga held that, given the express language
of the escrow requirement in Fla. Stat. Section 718.202(5), the
developer’s failure to establish two separate escrow accounts for the
plaintiffs’ deposit violated the statute, and rendered the purchase and
sale agreement in violation of the contract.12 This holding, which was
essentially affirmed on appeal,13 upended the traditional financing
model for new condominium construction projects.14
The Florida legislature recognized the extent of the problems
posed by Judge Altonaga’s opinion and moved quickly to quash
attempts by investors to receive refunds on their deposits. The
legislature amended Section 718.202 to include the following:
All funds deposited into escrow pursuant to subsection
(1) or subsection (2) may be held in one or more
escrow accounts by the escrow agent. If only one
8

In re Mona Lisa at Celebration, LLC, 472 B.R. 582 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012);
Daneri v. BCRE Brickell, LLC, 79 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); CRC 603, LLC
v. North Carillon, LLC, 77 So. 3d 655 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011); In re Harbour
East Dev., Ltd., 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2509 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011);. In re Laketown
Wharf Mktg. Corp., 433 B.R. 401 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2010); Degirmenci v. SapphireFort Lauderdale, LLLP, 693 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Double AA Int’l
Inv. Group, Inc. v. Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (S.D. Fla.
2009).
9
Double AA Int’l Group Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1344; CRC 603, LLC, 77 So. 3d
655.
10
In re Harbour East Dev., Ltd., 2011 Bankr. LEXIS at 2509.
11
Double AA Int’l Inv. Group, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1344.
12
Id.
13
Double AA Int’l Inv. Group, Inc. v. Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc., 637 F.3d
1169 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district court did not err in finding the
contract void under § 718.202(5) for failure to maintain a separate accounting, and
finding reversible error only in the district court’s authorization of a private cause of
action against an escrow agent).
14
Interview, Dean Douglas Bischoff, Director, University of Miami School of
Law Master of Laws (LL.M.) Program in Real Property Development (Oct. 23,
2013).
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escrow account is used, the escrow agent must maintain
separate accounting records for each purchaser and for
amounts separately covered under subsections (1) and
(2) and, if applicable, released to the developer
pursuant to subsection (3). Separate accounting by the
escrow agent of the escrow funds constitutes
compliance with this section even if the funds are held
by the escrow agent in a single escrow account. It is the
intent of this subsection to clarify existing law.15
Despite the inclusion of the amendment’s last line–”it is the
intent of this subsection to clarify existing law”–the federal
bankruptcy court declined to retroactively apply the 2010 amendment,
and stated the line did not change the analysis.16
This Article will analyze the aforementioned events starting
with an historical survey to trace how the subprime mortgage crisis
came to be and how the South Florida commercial real estate market,
specifically new condominium construction financing, was affected.
The authors will then discuss the legislative intent of the original
Florida Statute Section 718.202, the impact of judicial activism in
Double AA Int’l Inv. Group, Inc. v. Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc., and the
precedent set by the Florida legislature in moving so quickly to amend
the statute. The Article will conclude with a discussion of the practical
impacts of these events and an analysis of how risks inherent to new
condominium construction financing have changed as a result of
heavy investing from the Latin American markets.
II.

DEVELOPING THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF REAL ESTATE
FINANCING

Many scholars identify the Great Depression-era as the source
of America’s late 2000s mortgage crisis,17 in large part because
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together hold or guarantee over five
trillion dollars in debt.18 Fannie Mae, a mortgage company properly
known as the Federal National Mortgage Association, has grown from

15

Fla. Stat. § 718.202(11) (2011).
In re Harbour East Dev., Ltd., 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2509 at *10 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2011).
17
See Matthew Speigal, The Academic Analysis of the 2008 Financial Crisis:
Round 1, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1773 (2011); Kronovet, supra note 1, 288; Peterson,
supra note 2.
18
Kate Pickert, A Brief History of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, TIME (July
14, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1822766,00.html.).
16
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a New Deal response to borrowers defaulting on their mortgages19
into the publically traded,20 “leading source of mortgage credit in the
U.S. secondary market.”21 Freddie Mac was similarly launched as a
government entity in 1970 to balance the market and preclude Fannie
Mae from monopolizing the mortgage industry.22 These organizations,
established to fix some of the time’s economic needs, grew far beyond
the expectations of the individuals who pioneered them.
A.

Tracing the Historical Origins of the Financial Crisis

Fannie Mae was among the first steps President Roosevelt
took to establish a “public financial infrastructure for residential home
mortgage loans.”23 Fannie Mae, especially, fed on the advent of
mortgage insurance programs at the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) that insured and guaranteed
lenders against borrowers defaulting.24 Congress hoped to incentivize
loans for home ownership by backing all loans designated for that
purpose.25 As a result, banks started to loan with low down payments
at low interest rates, and offered a long-term fixed rate26 that
accommodated American consumers.
These developments would also bear fruit in other sectors of
the real estate market, most notably in the condominium partition of
19

Id. “During the Great Depression, as borrowers defaulted on mortgages en
masse and banks found themselves strapped for cash, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Congress created Fannie Mae in 1938 in order to buy mortgages from
lenders, freeing up capital that could go to other borrowers. Although Fannie Mae
began with just $1 billion in purchasing power, the agency helped usher in a new
generation of American home ownership, paving the way for banks to loan money
to low- and middle-income buyers who otherwise might not have been considered
creditworthy.”
20
Id. (“Fannie Mae grew so large over the years that in 1968, with the
pressures of the Vietnam War straining the national budget, President Lyndon
Johnson took Fannie Mae’s debt portfolio off the government balance sheet; Fannie
Mae was converted into a publicly traded company owned by investors.”); see
generally Fannie Mae, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2014, 3:59 PM),
http://quotes.wsj.com/FNMA.
21
Company Overview: Who is Fannie Mae Today?, FANNIE MAE,
http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/about-us/company-overview/about-fm.html (last
visited Sept. 22, 2014).
22
Pickert, supra note 18.
23
Peterson, supra note 2, at 1107.
24
Kronovet, supra note 1, at 291.
25
Id.
26
Id.
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the commercial real estate sector.27 In 1961, the National Housing
Act, Section 23428 authorized the FHA to insure mortgage loans
secured by condominium laws where states had passed such
legislation.29 Subsequently, those states that had not established laws
governing condominium regimes did so, which proved critical to the
growth of the condominium form of ownership.30 As condominium
ownership became more popular in the 1960s, new developments
financed by traditional construction loans became commonplace.31
While most loans were long-term and financed by insurance
companies, savings banks, too, provided “permanent loans” for
smaller projects.32 These loans were repaid out of the proceeds of
individual unit sales.33
Carl Fisher, of Miami Beach, pioneered the notion of using
condominiums to meet population growth in South Florida,34 and the
results, while mixed at first, were eye-catching. Developers enhanced
apartment complexes with recreational facilities and sold units
quickly, which paid off construction loans, recovered initial
investments, and generated handsome profits from sales and
annuities.35 Thrifts, savings and loans banks, and insurance
companies—a group that is considered the “traditional providers of
debt capital for commercial real estate”36—protected their interests by
imposing strict pre-sale conditions on the construction loans,37 but
buyers were still more than willing to sign contracts for apartments
they could only see on bulletin board sketches.38
27

The essential definition of commercial real estate is, in this Article,
borrowed from a report Elizabeth Warren wrote for the Congressional Oversight
Panel. Commercial real estate is defined by financial supervisors as “‘multifamily’
property and ‘nonfarm nonresidential’ property. Commercial properties are
generally income-producing assets, generating rental or other income and having a
potential for capital appreciation.” ELIZABETH WARREN, CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL,
Pub. L. No. 110-343, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
LOSSES AND THE RISK TO FINANCIAL STABILITY (2010) at 5.
28
National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715(y) (1989).
29
Richard Kane, The Financing of Cooperatives and Condominiums: A
Retrospective, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 101, 102 (1999).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 104.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 105.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 106-07.
36
Kronovet, supra note 1, at 295.
37
Kane, supra note 29, at 108.
38
Id. at 109.
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The Development of a Secondary Mortgage Market

Fannie Mae continued buying these residential and
commercial securitized loans as lenders’ financing spigots opened
and, by 1968, occupied too large of a space for President Johnson’s
liking; he split the organization into the aforementioned privatized
company, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) administered Government National Mortgage Association
(“Ginnie Mae”) which was specifically responsible for government
special assistance and housing support programs.39 When Freddie
Mac was created not long thereafter in 1970, the nation got its first
glimpse of the secondary mortgage market, which would eventually
hold and service loans originated elsewhere.40
The active secondary market would prove quite large, which
yielded novel financing techniques.41 In 1970, Ginnie Mae offered the
world its first look at how mortgage-backed securities might be
publically traded, wherein revenue comes from loans in which the
underlying loan is backed by property.42 Investors were guaranteed
full and timely payment of principle and interest as their investments
were backed by the United States.43 Freddie Mac broadened the field
of mortgage-backed securities in 1983, when it introduced the
collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO), which will be discussed
later.44
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which went public in 1989,45
have come under heavy criticism of late because they have become
too big to fail.46 The organizations raise money from pension funds,
mutual funds, and foreign sources, as well as a variety of other

39

Kronovet, supra note 1, at 291-92.
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, A Brief History of the Housing GovernmentSponsored Enterprises, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, available at
http://fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/History%20of%20the%20Government%20Sponsor
ed%20Enterprises.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
41
Kronovet, supra note 1, at 292.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 293.
45
Pickert, supra note 18.
46
Dawn Kopecki, Fannie, Freddie Are Too Big to Fail, Lawmakers Say
(Updated1), BLOOMBERG NEWS, (July 10, 2008. 6:52 PM), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid=a8TSO
UOgFPFw.
40
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sources,47 which gives both the kind of dominance over global
economies that forced the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury to
guarantee those investments.48
C.

Securitization of the Commercial Real Estate Market

As the capital markets became more innovative by
securitization, the commercial real estate markets found they needed
to turn to nontraditional sources of funding as well. The OPEC oil
embargo of 1973-74 caused interest rates to spike and doomed many
projects’ success.49 Developers who had already pre-sold a majority
of units in the buildings could not correct for higher construction
costs, which led to many developers simply choosing to default and
lenders to foreclosure.50 As these financial institutions became flush
with illiquid assets, individuals were pulling their money out of their
coffers to invest in higher-yield instruments.51 This left banks, which
had employed those coffers to issue home mortgage loans, in a bind:
Would-be retirees could not sell their homes in the
North because the prospective purchasers for those
homes could not obtain mortgage financing to do so.
Even when those retirees were able to rid themselves of
their real estate obligations in other parts of the
country, loans were not available for them to purchase
the units owned by the banks in retirement locations.52
Lenders, who were subjected to heavy pressure legislatively
and by the market, were left with little choice but to write-down the
value of the properties, partner with developers to complete the
projects, and sell the units at heavy discounts,53 for a “profit.”54
By the late 1970s, lenders were willing and able to jump back
into the commercial real estate market to finance new projects.55 The
financiers who got back into the market in the early stages of the
recovery were soon posting profits suitable to entice some of their
47

Pickert, supra note 18.
Id.
49
Kane, supra note 29, at 110-11.
50
Id at 111-12.
51
Id. at 112.
52
Id. at 113.
53
Id. at 114.
54
Id. The ability to report a profit was enabled by creative accounting that
acknowledged that sale prices outstripped previously heavily written-down book
values for the developments.
55
Kane, supra note 29, at 114.
48
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previously burned lending contemporaries back into the field.56 By the
1980s, the market was thriving again.57
D.

Florida Legislative Action to Regulate Condominium Pre-Sale
Activity

During the late 1970s, many state legislatures passed laws
regulating the various aspects of preconstruction financing of new
condominium developments. One such state was Florida, which
addressed
this
topic
through
Florida
Statute
Section 718.202 in 1976.58 The statute, which addresses specifically
the sales and reservation deposits prior to closing, has been amended
eight times since its inception,59 most notably in 2010 following a
wave of litigation during the mortgage crisis.60
The Florida Legislature created Chapter 718 following six
years of revisions to provisions “to protect buyers ‘who placed
deposits with developers’ for preconstruction condominiums.”61 The
initial provisions, enacted in 1970, were contained in Florida Statute
Section 711.25 and housed three subsections pertinent to the instant
case, Double AA Int’l Inv. Group, Inc. v. Swire Pac. Holdings. The
first required sellers to have a special account for deposits that was
prohibited from commingling with the seller’s other accounts before
the buyer was made aware of the commencement of construction on
his unit.62 After that notice, the second provision permitted developers
to withdraw funds from that special account for construction purposes
so long as the presale contract contained a warning that such
allocations were allowable.63 The final provision held developers
accountable for misuse of funds with the threat of embezzlement
charges.64
In 1974, the Florida Legislature opted to transfer Section
711.25 to Section 711.67, amending the legislation to require
developers to:
56

Id.
Id. at 115.
58
Double AA Int’l Inv. Grp. Inc., 2010 WL 1258086, at *11.
59
Fla. Stat. § 718.202 (2011).
60
E.g., Double AA Int’l Inv. Grp. Inc., 2010 WL 1258086.
61
Id. at *6 (citing Michael Anderson, Legal Protection for Florida
Condominium and Cooperative Buyers and Owners, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451, 459
(1973)).
62
Id. at *7.
63
Id. at *9.
64
Id.
57
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[e]stablish an escrow with a bank or trust company
having trust powers, an attorney who is a member of
the Florida Bar, or a title company authorized to do
business in the State of Florida, with whom shall be
deposited all payments received by the developer from
the buyer of such parcel upon the sale price of the
parcel until the amount deposited shall equal 5 percent
of the sale price. The escrowed funds may be deposited
in separate accounts or in common escrow or trust
accounts or commingled with other escrow or trust
moneys handled by or received by the escrow agent.65
These changes are notable in the explicit requirements for
developers to use escrow agents and to deliberately separate the
accounts with a five percent protected deposit. Given how these
legislative developments transpired, it is clear that the legislature
intended for presale construction procedures to protect buyers against
the kind of developer defaults that left owners with little recourse in
years prior.
The Florida Legislature decided in 1976 to create Chapter 718
from the Florida Condominium Act. In the process, the protected
deposit was increased from five to ten percent, escrow agents were
given flexibility to determine how best to maintain the protected
deposits, and the release of deposits was elucidated for four potential
scenarios.66 Further changes to the diction and structure of the Act67
65

Fla. Stat. § 711.67(1) (Supp. 1974).
See § 711.67(1) (Supp. 1974); compare with § 711.202 (Supp. 1976).
67
Judge Altonaga’s opinion laid out those changes which expanded the
consumer protection provisions:
The word “escrow” was inserted in subsection (2): “All payments
in excess of the 10 percent of the sale price. . .shall be held in a
special escrow account by the developer or his agent and may not
be used by the developer prior to closing the transaction, except
as provided by subsection (3) or except for refund to the buyer.”
Subsection (3), which set out the conditions for using the
construction deposits, was revised to include a direct reference to
subsection (2). “(3) If the contract for sale of the condominium
unit so provides, the developer may withdraw escrow funds in
excess of 10 percent of the purchase price from the special
account required by subsection (2) when the construction of
improvements has begin. The language regarding a buyer’s
option to void was removed from subsection (3) where it had
previously been limited only to violations of that subsection, and
was set out as a wholly new subsection applicable to the entire
Section. Effectively, the Legislature imposed strict liability on the
66
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strengthened the consumer protection and voiding provisions, in part
by adding criminal penalties and referring specifically to multiple
escrow accounts.68 These clarifications continued to address many of
legislative concerns that had been brought about by the previously
described crisis.
The 1979 Legislature amended Chapter 718 to address
reservation agreements, which were the outgrowth of developers
attempting to generate revenue prior to the sale of condominiums,69
thereby skirting around the need to comply with the statute. Several
later amendments through the end of the 1988 legislative session
further clarified the protected deposit procedures and how the escrow
agent may disburse funds.70
E.

Securitizing the Markets to Novel Construction Financing
Techniques

On a national scale, investment creativity was expanding far
beyond the boundaries first envisioned by President Roosevelt.
Whereas the original securitized loans were mortgages that were
supposed to encourage home buying, the 1980s saw many other
products—health care receivables and student loans, to name a
couple—securitized71 by using special purpose vehicles (SPV)72
without any sort of collateral backing. This was a marked change
from the days when non-mortgage asset securitization was mainly
commercial paper-based,73 and likely came about as a result of
deregulated bank lending.74
As the capital market was printing money on the concept of
SPVs, two distinct and important changes were occurring in the
developer in favor of the buyer.
(Double AA Int’l Inv. Grp., Inc. 2010 WL 1258086, at *11-12 (citing § 718.202(2)
(Supp. 1976)); § 718.202(3) (Supp. 1976); § 718.205(2) (Supp. 1976).
68
See § 711.67(1) (Supp. 1974); compare with § 711.202 (Supp. 1976).
69
Double AA Int’l Inv. Grp., Inc., 2010 WL 1258086, at *12.
70
See generally Double AA Int’l Inv. Grp., Inc., 2010 WL 1258086.
71
Kronovet, supra note 1, at 295.
72
Id. at 294. The Sperry Corporation created a subsidiary (a SPV) to serve as
an entity for the securitized transaction of issuing lease-based notes and sold
computer operating leases to the SPV, which then offered fixed rate notes backed by
the pledges of the leases.
73
Id.
74
See Bertrand Renaud, The 1985 to 1994 Global Real Estate Cycle: An
Overview, 5 J. OF REAL ESTATE 13 (1997) (“Fresh out of their secure regulated
environment, banks tended to underestimate the risks they faced with the new
borrowers.”).
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commercial real estate market that would substantially increase the
influence Wall Street had over that sector. The first was the
aforementioned creation in 1983 of the collateralized mortgage
obligation,75 a tradable security backed by mortgages that is divided
into tranches.76 These investment tranches group mortgages together
by assessed risk and allow for different classes of investors to buy
packages ranging from low-risk, determined reward to high-risk,
high-reward.77
The second monumental change transpired as the developers
adapted a new means to combat municipal attempts to regulate rent
prices.78 As cities moved to stabilize rent prices, developers had
another idea in mind: convert apartment buildings into condominiums
and cooperatives.79 “For landlords who find themselves beset with
rising costs for maintenance and utilities, complaints from tenants,
and the growing influence of rent control ordinances, conversion may
seem an ideal way out of an uncomfortable position.”80 Borrowers
took advantage of lender’s hasty efforts to compete with one another,
receiving loans on a fully exculpated basis,81 with little investment by
the converter.82 This appears to be one of the earliest examples of
lenders in commercial real estate markets making loans on security
interests that were not tangible in nature,83 and is a strong early
75

Pickert, supra note 18.
Peter Dellgren & Mattias Larsson, Collateralized Mortgage Obligation and
the Subprime Crisis (May 25, 2009) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Uppsala University)
(on file with Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University).
77
Kronovet, supra note 1, at 293.
78
Kane, supra note 29, at 123.
79
Id.
80
Dale A. Whitman, Financing Condominiums and Cooperatives, 13 TULSA L.
J. 15, 39 (1977).
81
Kane, supra note 29, at 123. Lenders who allowed for fully exculpated loans
were limited to foreclosing on the security interest of the defaulting borrower, and
were precluded from filing against the borrower’s other investment assets.
82
Whitman, supra note 80, at 40. Apartment buildings that underwent
conversion were worth as much as forty percent more once they were buildings with
individual unit owners. Id. at 39. Interim loans to finance conversions are “usually
limited to 75 or 80 percent of the property’s value as a condominium” but this
would likely approach the full value of the rental project. Id. at 40. As such,
borrowers oftentimes had to put in about ten percent of the conversion costs in order
to obtain an interim loan. Id.
83
See Kane, supra note 29, at 123.
Lenders made bulk-unit loans to developers with respect to which
security interests were classified as: (a) developer-unsold shares
in cooperatives (in which case the lender took a security interest
76
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example of a trend towards real estate securitization.84
Lenders were eager to get involved in conversions for the
same reason that developers were trying to borrow money: the profit
margins involved in conversions are considerable.85 Lenders were
primarily concerned with cash flows during the conversion period, as
the converter had to account for interest payments, operating costs of
the rental properties during the transition period, and assessments to
the new owner’s association.86 As important as lenders’ reliance on
these projections were, lenders seemingly failed to learn from the
commercial real estate market collapse of the 1970s; “although these
estimated sales prices were frequently tested by appraisals, the values
of the appraisals were predicated on then-soaring (and in hindsight,
grossly unrealistic) values.”87 Further, these lenders failed to take the
developers’ promises to make substantial improvements during the
conversion with a necessary grain of salt.88
Predictably, the commercial real estate market collapsed at the
end of the 1980s; developers walked away from their projects instead
of investing their personal funds, and lenders were left with empty
securities and forced, once again, to take massive write-downs.89
in the shares of stock and the proprietary lease owned by the
developer); (b) developer-unsold condominium unites (in which
case the developer’s bulk lender took a mortgage or deed of trust
on the unites); or (c) developer-sold units (in which case, since
the only remaining interest that the developer would have after
the unit was sold would have been whatever purchase-money
security interest that the developer may have retained in either a
co-op or a condo, the developer’s bulk-lender took collateral
assignments of the purchase-money loan documents and security
taken back by the developer from the new unit purchasers).
84
Crocker H. Liu, The Integration of the Real Estate Market and the Stock
Market: Some Preliminary Evidence, 3 J. OF REAL EST. FIN. AND ECON. 261 (1990).
85
See Kane, supra note 29. Buildings could be expected to worth as much as
forty percent more than they were as rental properties, with only small common area
improvements needed.
86
Whitman, supra note 80, at 41.
87
Kane, supra note 29, at 123.
88
Id. The Nebraska legislature attempted to fill empty developer promises by
passing legislation defining brochures, drawings, and other promotional materials
concerning condominium developments as express warranties; holding developers
accountable for pre-purchase promises became one mechanism for ensuring that
projected cash flows were accurate and lenders could issue notes in good faith. Id.
(citing Doris Ware McCall, New Law on Condos Means Developers Must Own Up
to Promises, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Sept. 18, 1983), available in 1983 WL
2097588).
89
Kane, supra note 29, at 124.
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Individual unit-owners found their buildings unmaintained and the
debt service unpaid, which led, oftentimes, to the helpless owners
losing their interests in a foreclosure of the building mortgage.90 The
developers were, for all intents and purposes, protected against any
litigation unit owners might take against them by business entities
similar to SPVs found in capital markets.91 Somewhat surprisingly,
many courts held for the non-owner rent-protected tenants to continue
occupying units after banks had foreclosed on the building.92 This
development compounded the agony felt by the now twice-burned
commercial real estate financiers.
F.

Integrating the Commercial Real Estate Markets with Capital
Markets

The world entered the first international commercial real estate
crash in 1990, at which time a “precipitous asset deflation”
commenced.93 On the international stage, governments “followed a
‘good bank-bad bank’ approach to solve the solvency problems of
distressed financial institutions. They have created asset-management
companies to dispose of problem assets in the least disruptive way
possible.”94 In the United States, the asset-management company was
a quasi-governmental body called the Resolution Trust Company
(RTC),95 which was essentially a federal deposit insurance company
for thrifts.96
American politicians made the decision that banks could not
be allowed to fail, so the RTC was created with the charge of
“liquidating the assets of insolvent thrift institutions and using the
revenue to recoup government outlays.”97 Generally considered a

90

Id. at 126.
Id.
92
Id. at 127.
93
Renaud, supra note 74, at 28.
94
Id. at 31.
95
Id. at 32.
96
Kronovet, supra note 1, at 295-96.
97
WARREN, supra note 27, at 18. The Warren report details the drastic
consequences of the market crash:
One consequence of the thrift and banking crisis of the late 1980s
and early 1990s was the sharp decline in the number of banks and
thrifts: in 1980, there were 14,222 banks, but only 10,313 by
1994. The thrift industry contracted from 3,234 savings and loans
in 1986 to 1,645 institutions in 1995. The banking sector also had
become more concentrated over this period, with the 25 largest
91
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success,98 the RTC was set up to sell real estate loans through a
securitization vehicle to lower transaction costs and avoid vultures.99
By 1993, the RTC securitized $14 billion, and people had come to
favor securitized loans.100 The RTC was closed in 1995 as its assetdeposition duty had been functionally fulfilled.101
As thrifts, savings and loans banks, and insurance companies
dried up, there opened a gaping financing void in the market. Capital
markets had been increasingly integrated102 into commercial real
estate markets as a result of technological innovations, deregulation of
government restrictions103 on the barriers between the markets, and by
increased securitization of the markets.104 Wall Street investment
banks bought into all cash flows that theoretically could be
securitized, regardless of what specifically secured those cash
flows.105
The outcome of this heightened degree of integration was that
commercial real estate financing started to resemble individual home
mortgage financing. Traditional lenders—the same thrifts, savings and
loans banks, and insurance companies who had sworn never again to
get involved in financing real estate106—identified that Wall Street’s
involvement afforded them a low-risk opportunity to jump into the
market as middle men who would issue loans and sell them as a

institutions holding 29.3 percent of insured banking deposits in
1980, growing to 42.9 percent in 1994.
98
Id.
99
Kronovet, supra note 1, at 295-96.
100
Id. at 296.
101
Renaud, supra note 73, at 22.
102
Integration and its antonym segmentation are a technical finance terms with
specific meanings that are rooted in how risky a given investment may be. Markets
that develop separately are likely considered segmented at the onset, and investors
do not necessarily earn the same expected return between two given markets. Liu,
supra note 5, at 22. As markets became more reliant on one another, to the point
that their risk factors are considered “systemic risk[s] relative to the overall market
index,” they are considered integrated. Id. at 261.
103
According to Bertrand Renaud of the World Bank Financial Sector
Development Department, some examples of financial deregulation include: (a) the
abolition of interest-rate controls or cartels that fixed these rates; (b) the abolition of
direct controls on credit expansion; (c) the development and improvement of
money, bond, and equity markets, and (d) the deregulation of fees and commissions
in financial services. Renaud, supra note 73, at 21.
104
David C. Ling, The Integration of Commercial Real Estate Markets and
Stock Markets, 27 REAL EST. ECON. 483, 505 (1999).
105
Kane, supra note 29, at 128.
106
Id.
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package to the investment banks.107 The process worked as follows:
A property buyer would approach a bank and request
money to facilitate the purchase. In return, the bank
would receive a mortgage and a promissory note.
Traditionally, the buyer would pay down the mortgage
over a number of years, and the bank would keep the
mortgage as a portfolio loan. With the proliferation of
securitization, the bank might instead sell the mortgage
and promissory note on the secondary market to a
Wall Street financier for cash. The mortgage would
then be packaged with many other mortgages and put
into a trust, into which all debt service cash flows
would go. The trust would be divided into several
tranches, with the most risk averse at the top, and the
highest risk/reward ratio at the bottom. A rating
agency determines the degree of risk of each tranche,
which is then put to market at each level.108
This process would prove fatal in bringing about the financial
crisis.
One reason that the crisis would prove so immense was
because the technology bubble burst of 2001 scattered investors
fearful of new industries back to traditional investments, such as real
estate.109 Public real estate investment trusts (“REITS”)–which
essentially embody the idea of making private ownership of
commercial real estate available to the public with a stock offering–
had gained popularity in the early 1990s, and continued to deliver a
strong return on investment through the 2001 financial crisis.110
Studies have found that in the years leading up to the mortgage
crisis, as investors were moving back into the safe haven of traditional
investments such as real estate,111 the quality of primary loans
gradually declined. One such study, conducted by Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland analyst Yuliya Demyanyk and New York
University Stern School of Business Professor Otto Van Hemert,
107

Id. at 128-29.
Alex Schimel, Lecturer in Law, University of Miami School of Law, Inclass guest lecturing on the mortgage crisis and its roots (Sept. 17, 2013).
109
WARREN, supra note 27, at 16.
110
See id. at 16-17.
111
Id. at 16; see also Marilyn B. Cane & Jennifer C. Erdelyi, 1031 Tenant in
Common Exchanges: A “Tic”king Time Bomb at the Intersection of Real Estate,
Securities, and Tax Law?, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 273, 273 (2006) (stating that
the unpredictability of the stock market also served as an impetus for investors to be
“drawn into the commercial real estate market in record numbers”).
108
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concluded, “[a]ll types of mortgages were issued, with lower and
lower credit standards. . .the market became ever more willing to
make higher-risk loans and the public responded by taking them out.
The loan particulars were of secondary importance.”112 Even as these
lenders were underestimating the performance of their loan pools,113
they hedged their bets by increasing the loan interest rates.114 Another
study by Michigan Ross School of Business Professor Amiyatosh
Purnanandam found that lenders were cognizant that they were
perhaps overly exposed to risk, and that those loans they sold on the
secondary market were substantially more likely to default.115
And default those borrowers did. Global financial markets
took a drastic hit starting on August 9, 2007, in large part because of
“protracted periods of low risk premiums.”116 This crisis was
primarily residential in nature, which is why former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan asserted “[t]he current credit crisis will
come to an end when the overhang of inventories of newly built
homes is largely liquidated, and home price deflation comes to an
end.”117 The commercial market was tangentially affected by the
mortgage crisis, despite the fact that loan underwriting and equity
requirements were loosened for both types of real estate.118
G.

Today’s Model of Preconstruction Financing of Condominium
Development

The Warren report highlights significant differences between
the financing of residential and commercial real estate properties that
illustrate why the commercial crash was less severe than its residential
112

Spiegel, supra note 17, at 1777.
As former Chairman of the Federal Reserve of the United States Alan
Greenspan described in a Wall Street Journal opinion piece, “risk had become
increasingly underpriced as market euphoria, fostered by an unprecedented global
growth rate, gained cumulative traction.” Alan Greenspan, The Roots of the
Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2007), at A19.
114
Spiegel, supra note 17, at 1776.
115
Id. Spiegel summarizes Purnanandam’s study as follows:
[Purnanandam] finds that a one-standard-deviation increase in a
bank’s propensity to sell off its loans increase[d] the subsequent
default rate by about 0.45%. Given how low default rates are in
general, this actually represents an overall increase of 32%. That
is, if one expected a mortgage default rate of about 6% overall,
then those sold off would see a rate of about 8%.
116
Greenspan, supra note 112.
117
Id. (emphasis added).
118
WARREN, supra note 27, at 11.
113
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counterpart:
Unlike most residential borrowers, commercial
borrowers tend to be real estate professionals.
Commercial borrowers are also expected to pay debt
service from property income rather than from
personal income, unlike homeowners. Consequently,
some of the loan structures that are used in the
residential mortgage market, such as stated income
loans or low introductory interest rates, are not
available in the commercial market. In addition, the
different tax treatment of commercial and residential
properties (especially the allowance of depreciation of
commercial properties) creates incentives for different
types of ownership and financing structures.119
Commercial development is often financed with one of two
types of short-term construction loans, generally issued by a
depository institution:120 “ADC,” for “acquisition, development, and
construction” or “C&D,” for “construction and development.”121
Many banks require a substantial amount of preconstruction sales to
help project the earning potential of the development for the purposes
of loan issuance.122
ADC loans typically are recourse loans issued with adjustable
rates.123 Unlike the fully exculpated loans124 that were hastily issued at
the peak of conversion sales, these recourse loans left the developer’s
general assets fully unprotected so as to be recoverable against in the
event of developer default.125 This is a remarkable change merely
twenty years after lenders were stumbling over one another to give
developers the best possible incentives to borrow. This imbalance of
power may protect lenders by forcing developers to use the best
possible prognostication tools to forecast revenue, but the owners of
individual units are still left hanging high and dry by the process.
For quite a while, new condominium owners who bought their
unit preconstruction were contractually limited as to how they might
recover their deposits from developers with whom they had invested.
Developers were seemingly only accountable to lenders to meet their

119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id.
See supra note 80.
Id.
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goals and promises, but the consumer protections of statutes like
Florida Statute Section 718.202 lay dormant and forgotten until 2009.
In Double AA Int’l Inv. Group, Inc. v. Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc.,
Judge Cecilia Altonaga restored, albeit temporarily,126 the legislated
teeth necessary to hold developers accountable to their individual unit
owners as well.
III. PRACTICAL IMPACT OF § 718.202 AND JUDGE ALTONAGA’S
DECISION
In 2009, the standard practice of allocating preconstruction
development funds was put to the test in Double AA Int’l Inv. Group,
Inc. v. Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. The case arises from a condominium
sale from a development named “Asia” on Brickell Key, in Miami,
Florida.127 The development consisted of 123 apartments, 24 of which
Swire, the developer for the project, agreed to complete within two
years.128 In September 2004, Double AA International Investment
Group entered into a reservation agreement with Swire for a unit in
the Asia development condominium.129 The condominium unit sold
for $1,160,000.00 with a 20% deposit of $232,000.00.130 On April 16,
2006, in accordance with Section 718.202(3), the Lawyers Title
allowed the developer to withdraw escrow funds in excess of 10% of
the purchase price for construction expenses.131 The funds in excess of
10% amounted to $116,000.132
This case was brought forth because when the deal failed to
close, Swire did not return the $232,000.00 deposit despite the
Plaintiffs’ demands that this was necessary because they were
exercising their right to void the Purchase and Sale Agreement.133 The
pertinent issue of the complaint deals with the fact that Swire was
potentially in violation of Section 718.202 after it failed to establish

126

See Part II.
Double AA Int’l Inv. Group, Inc. v. Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc., 674 F. Supp.
2d 1344, 1346 (S.D.F.L. 2009), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2011).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. See also Fla. Stat. § 718.202(3) (“If the contract for sale of the
condominium unit so provides, the developer may withdraw escrow funds in excess
of 10 percent of the purchase price from the special account required by subsection
(2) when the construction of improvements has begun.
132
Double AA, Int’l Inv. Group, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1346.
133
Id.
127
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two separate escrow accounts for the $232,000.00 deposit.134
According to the Plaintiffs, the language in Section 718.202 clearly
requires the creation of an escrow account for 10% of the purchase
price and another, separate account, for any deposit in excess of 10%.
Double AA and Rodriguez contend that this failure renders the
Purchase and Sale Agreement void, entitling them to a full return of
the deposit.135 Swire argued that this theory “has no support in the
Statute’s plain language,” and that “[n]o part of the statute requires a
developer to maintain more than one escrow account.”136
By contending that the language in Section 718.202 allows a
buyer to receive a full refund of their deposit should a developer
default or a deal fail to close, Double AA created a potentially
catastrophic problem to the entire preconstruction financing system
that has been in place in the state of Florida since the 1970s.
According to University of Miami School of Law Associate
Dean Douglas K. Bischoff, it was common practice for commercial
real estate developers to place all deposits into a single escrow
account.137 However, Dean Bischoff noted that Florida developers
still complied with Section 718.202(3) by only withdrawing funds in
excess of 10% of the purchase price. These developers never
contemplated creating two separate escrow accounts because the legal
system did not appear to require it. A serious issue would arise if
every preconstruction buyer began to demand a full refund of its
deposits because of the interpretation of Section 718.202.
Construction on condominiums throughout the state would be
postponed or ended altogether as funding quickly ran out.
The timing of Double AA came during the height of the
mortgage crisis, at a time when the South Florida commercial real
estate market was experiencing a “dramatic deterioration of
commercial real estate fundamentals”138:
Increasing vacancy rates and falling rental prices
present problems for all commercial real estate loans.
Decreased cash flows will affect the ability of
borrowers to make required loan payments. Falling
commercial property values result in higher LTV
134

Id. at 1348.
Id.
136
Id. (alteration in original). Swire cites subsection 1 and 2 of the statute,
claiming that only a single account need be created because the statute does not say
a “different” escrow account, or “other” escrow account.
137
Interview with Douglas Bischoff, Associate Dean for Adjunct Faculty,
University of Miami School of Law, in [Coral Gables], [FL] (Oct. 15, 2013).
138
WARREN, supra note 27, at 27.
135
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ratios, making it harder for borrowers to refinance
under current terms regardless of the soundness of the
original financing, the quality of the property, and
whether the loan is performing False Construction
loans are experiencing the biggest problems with
vacancy or cash flow issues, having the highest
likelihood of default, and have higher loss severity
rates than other commercial real estate loans.139
In order to determine the meaning of Section 718.202, Judge
Altonaga cites to Bhd. Of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen.
Comm. Of Adjustment CSX Transp. N. Lines v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
which states that “[t]he primary principle of statutory construction
requires courts to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used
‘in their ordinary and usual sense.’”140
A.

Judge Altonaga’s Plain Meaning Interpretation of
Section 718.202

In Double AA, Judge Altonaga was faced with the issue of
whether a failure to establish two separate escrow accounts when
deposits are above 10% of the purchase price violates Section 718.202
so as to render the contract voidable.141 The language of the statute
that aided in its interpretation was that all payments in excess of 10%
of the purchase price are earmarked for the construction of the
condominium and to be held in a “special” escrow account.142 Judge
Altonaga determined that the Florida legislature intended for the
modifier “special” to differentiate separate accounts for payments up
to 10% and payments in excess of 10%.143
The opinion continues with a plain meaning interpretation of
the words of Section 718.202 through Judge Altonaga’s understanding
that subsection 3 further proves the statute calls for separate accounts.
This Section states that if the contract so provides, a developer may
withdraw funds in excess of 10% “from the special account required

139

Id. at 23.
Bhd. Of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. Of Adjustment CSX
Transp. N. Lines v. CSX Transp., Inc., 522 F.3d 1190, 1194-1195 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1917).
141
Double AA Int’l Inv. Group, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.
142
Id. at 1349. FLA. STAT. § 718.202(2) (“3) (“[T]he developer may withdraw
escrow funds in excess of 10 percent of the purchase price from the special account
required by subsection (2) when the construction of improvements has begun.”).
143
Double AA Int’l Inv. Group, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1349.
140
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by subsection (2).”144 Judge Altonaga reasoned that the language in
this subsection would be completely meaningless if the statute
required only one escrow account.145 The plain meaning reasoning
makes sense because if the state intended to only require one escrow
account, then there would be no point to include the other
subsections.146
Therefore, Judge Altonaga’s holding stated that:
Swire violated Section 718.202 by failing to establish
two separate escrow accounts. Accordingly, the Court
grants summary judgment to Plaintiffs as to Count II, a
declaratory judgment that Swire violated Section
718.202, and Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a
refund of their deposit funds from Swire and Lawyers
Title, plus interest, under Florida Statute Section
718.202(5).147
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed Judge Altonaga’s decision.148 However, the Eleventh Circuit
focused on Swire’s contention “that the requirements of section
718.202 are met by a ‘separate accounting’ of the funds placed in
escrow in excess of ten percent. . .even if all of the deposited funds
are kept in a single account.”149
According to the record, Swire had only one escrow account
for all of the preconstruction deposits.150 Everything was in one
account, with only a separate buyer’s transaction log for each
condominium unit.151 However, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the
transaction log did not separate the protected 10% from the deposits in
excess of 10% of the purchase price.152 Two distinct columns were

144

Id. (quoting § 718.202(3)).
Id. (“The language and various sections of the statute clearly contemplate
two separate escrow accounts: one for payments of up to 10 percent of the purchase
price, and a second, separate account for any payments beyond 10 percent of the
purchase price.”)
146
Id. (“If the only issue was the disbursement of funds, the statute could have
very easily been written to state that. The statute, as written, however, calls for
separate accounts for the separate levels of deposits.”).
147
Id. at 1351.
148
Double AA Int’l Inv. Group, Inc. v. Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc., 637 F.3d
1169, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011) (aff’g Count I against Defendant Swire, rev’g and
remanding Count II against Lawyers Title).
149
Id. at 1170-71.
150
Id. at 1171 (emphasis added).
151
Id.
152
Id.
145
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placed in the account to distinguish the separate accounts, but the
“columns simply were not utilized to keep track of the deposits at
issue in this case.”153 The escrow agent received no indication of
which funds were protected under Section 718.202(1).154 Therefore,
not only did Judge Altonaga determine that the contract was voidable
for a failure to create two escrow accounts, the Eleventh Circuit also
held:
[R]egardless of whether the statute requires one
escrow account or two, the district court did not err in
finding the contract voidable under Section 718.202(5)
for failure to maintain a separate accounting, and
therefore did not err in ordering the full return of
Plaintiffs’ deposits plus interest. Swire’s argument that
this issue was not before the district court lacks merit
as the issue was raised before the district court,
evidence about the separate accounting was presented,
and we see no error in the district court’s reaching this
issue.155
The result of Double AA, at the height of the mortgage crisis,
thus appeared to bring to reality the catastrophic fear for commercial
real estate developers mentioned by Dean Bischoff, and
simultaneously brought “hope to contract holders hungry for [a]
successful strategy to help them recover their deposits.”156 However,
this beacon of hope for buyers searching for an avenue to retain their
20% deposits did not last very long.
IV. AMENDING SECTION 718.202 – REACTION AND AFTERMATH OF
SECTION 718.202
Just days after the March 30 ruling by Judge Altonaga,
lawyers representing developers from across Florida marched on
Tallahassee to push for an amendment to Section 718.202.157 The
proposed amendment “shows how quickly an industry can get the
Florida Legislature to act in their favor.”158 This amendment was a
part of the larger Senate Bill 1196, attempting to revamp the way
153

Id.
Id.
155
Id. (footnote omitted)
156
Paola Iuspa-Abbott, Bill would reverse ruling on deposit accounts; Win
could be overturned; CONDO MELTDOWN, THE MIAMI DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW,
May 28, 2010, at A1.
157
Id.
158
Id.
154
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Florida governs condominiums.159 Subsection 11 states:
If only one escrow account is used, the escrow agent must
maintain separate accounting records for each purchaser and for
amounts separately covered under subsections (1) and (2). . .Separate
accounting by the escrow agent of the escrow funds constitutes
compliance with this section even if the funds are held by the escrow
agent in a single escrow account.160
Proponents of the amendment wanted the change to apply
retroactively in order to void the March 30 ruling and other deposit
recovery complaints.161 Senator Mike Fansano, who co-sponsored the
amendment in addition to the rest of Senate Bill 1196, commented
that “he never intended to hurt consumers”:
We did everything we could based on the information
that was given to us. . .I will be glad to check into it
further. We can certainly change the law if we feel it
may not be as consumer friendly as we hoped it would
be”[, but] the change to Section 718.202 would help
close a loophole that allowed contract holders with no
legitimate reason to cancel their agreements and
retrieve their deposits. “If you have a legitimate reason
where the developer did not fulfill his or her
contractual agreement, certainly you should be able to
get the money back.162
Alexander Lian, who represented Double AA, immediately
commented that he already had a plan to combat any attempt to get
the Double AA ruling thrown out.163 Lian argues there is no way the
current Florida legislature could have possibly known what legislators
in the 1970s meant when Section 718.202 was initially enacted.164
Ultimately however, on June 1, 2010, the amendment was signed into
law by the Florida legislature, setting the stage for the final battle over
preconstruction deposits. The question of whether Section
718.202(11) would apply retroactively was left up to Florida’s judicial
system.

159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
FLA. STAT. § 718.202 (2014).
Iuspa-Abbott, supra note 156.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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To Be Retroactive or Not To Be Retroactive, That is the Question

CRC 603, LLC v. North Carillon, LLC represented the
ultimate decision on the Section 718.202 issue that flooded South
Florida’s court system with lawsuits during the commercial real estate
bust. The issue that the Third District Court of Appeals faced was
“whether the 2010 amendment alters the analysis set forth in Double
AA or the application of that analysis to the 2006 contracts and 2009
causes of action by the buyers.”165 Thus, the pertinent question in
CRC 603 sets out to determine the validity of retroactively applying
Section 718.202(11). Just as the outcome in Double AA proved to be
important to Florida’s commercial real estate market, Judge Salter
equally understood the crucial significance of CRC 603: “The stakes
are significant for the parties and for others—one consequence of the
current real estate recession in South Florida is that many prospective
condominium buyers are attempting to void the purchase contracts
they signed in what hindsight now discloses was an irrationally
exuberant real estate market.”166
In CRC 603, the developer argued that the 2010 amendment to
Section 718.202 clarified the amendment overall, and could therefore
be applied retroactively, thus applying to this case.167 However, Judge
Salter believed the 2010 amendment was more than an attempt to
clarify existing law,168 Salter’s opinion notes that decades-long gaps
between the enacting of a statute and its clarification will disallow the
ability of any statute to be applied retroactively.169 The original statute
and the amendment in CRC 603 are separated by much more than a
decade; the 2010 amendment comes 25 years after Section 718.202

165

CRC 603, LLC v. North Carillon, LLC, 77 So. 3d 655, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011), rev’d, 135 So. 3d 274 (Fla. 2014).).
166
Id. at 657
167
Id. at 659 “(The developer also argues that the amendment is procedural and
remedial in nature, such that it applies to contracts and causes of action in existence
upon the effective date. If the 2010 amendment applies to May 2006 contracts and a
December 2009 cause of action, then the single escrow account for the ‘10 percent’
and ‘in excess of the 10 percent’ deposits complies with section 718.202 and the
developer and escrow agent need only prove that they kept ‘separate accounting
records’ for each purchaser and the amounts deposited under section 718.202(1) and
the amounts deposited or withdrawn under section 718.202(2) and (3).”).
168
Id. at 660.
169
Id. at 660 (See also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55,
62 (Fla. 1995) (“It would be absurd. . .to consider legislation enacted more than ten
years after the original act as a clarification of original intent; the membership of the
1992 legislature substantially differed from that of the 1982 legislature.”).
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was enacted.170
Judge Salter further noted the 2010 amendment could not be
applied retroactively because the Florida Constitution prohibits it.171
Article 1, Section 10, of the Florida Constitution states that “[n]o bill
of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.”172 Thus, despite the intention of the Florida
Legislature that the 2010 amendment and new Section 718.202(11) be
applied retroactively, the court concluded, “this would impermissibly
impair each buyer’s pre-amendment contract rights.”173
This decision by Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals, in
conjunction with Judge Altonaga’s decision in Double AA, resulted in
two cataclysmic losses for developers in Florida’s deposit recovery
disputes174 at the peak of the financial crisis. The result was disturbing
because the opinion gave no mention of an apparent advisory opinion
issued by the State of Florida to developers.175 The guidance to
developers on the issue of Section 718.202 suggested that separate
accounting records would suffice.176 Clearly the advice was
misguided and developers who tailored their preconstruction
financing accounting in this manner were severely harmed by Judge
Altonaga’s and Judge Salter’s decisions. Therefore, for all cases
leading up to the 2010 amendments, purchasers now had a strong and
convincing argument to recover their entire deposit.
B.

The Florida Supreme Court’s Final Say on Section 718.202

On January 23, 2014, the Florida Supreme Court handed down
the final ruling in the North Carillon battle with CRC 603.177 In the
ruling, Judge Canady agreed that the retroactive effect would be
unconstitutional, but disagreed “with the Third District’s conclusion
that the 2010 amendment made a substantive change in the law”.178
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the Third District’s
decision because it “conclude[d] that the contracts were not voidable
170

CRC, 77 So. 3d at 660.
Id.
172
Prohibited Laws, Fla. Const. art. 1, § 10.
173
CRC, 77 So. 3d at 661.
174
Hugo Alvarez, Florida Appellate Court Ruling Significantly Favors Buyers
in Condo Deposit Recovery Disputes, MIAMI REAL ESTATE ATTORNEY BLOG (Sept.
25, 2011) http://www.miamirealestateattorneyblog.com/deposit-recovery.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
North Carillon, LLC v. CRC 603, LLC, 135 So. 3d 274 (Fla. 2014).
178
Id. at 275-76.
171
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under the statutory provisions in force in 2006, when the contracts
were entered.”179
First, because the Court clearly concludes the language of
Section 718.202 is ambiguous, it turns to the statutory history to
resolve the ambiguities.180 Strangely though, after failing to sort out
the ambiguities, Judge Canady and the Florida Supreme Court are
attempting to resort to the rule of lenity,181 usually used for
ambiguous criminal statutes, to resolve this civil case.
In analyzing the statutory history, the Court points out a
different issue in the wording that was not raised by Judge Altonaga
in Double AA. The Court recognizes that the word “special” did not
have any intended meaning for an escrow account at all.182 In fact,
“[t]he word ‘special’ originally was employed in the statute to
designate not an escrow account but an account of the seller/developer
that was not comingled with the funds of the seller/developer”183:
In 1976, the Legislature adopted the Condominium
Act and made revisions to the deposit statute. The
dividing line between the two types of buyer deposits
changed from five percent of the sale price to ten
percent of the sale price, and the term “special
account” in Section 711.67(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.
1974), became a “special escrow account” in Section
718.202(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976). See ch. 76222, § 1, Laws of Fla. Notwithstanding the addition of
the word “escrow” to the account description in
Section 718.202(2), the statute continued to state that
the account for deposits over ten percent of the sale
price could be held “by the developer” subject to the
condition that the funds were not to be used by the
developer prior to closing. § 718.202(2), Fla. Stat.
(Supp.1976).184
In the end however, the Court determined that “the complex
statutory history [did] not satisfactorily resolve the ambiguity in the
2006 statute.”185

179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. at 276.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 277-78.
Id. 278.
Id.
Id. at 278-79.
Id. at 279.
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The Bizarre Use of the Rule of Lenity

After concluding that Section 718.202 could not be clarified
through a historical perspective, Judge Canady turned to North
Carillon’s argument that when the language of a statute “is susceptible
of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the
accused.”186 Although normally applied in criminal cases, North
Carillon claims, and the Court agrees, that the rule of lenity is
applicable here because Section 718.202(7) states that failure to
comply with the statute is a felony of the third degree.187 Citing
several United States Supreme Court cases, Judge Canady determined
that the rule of lenity applies because such statutes must be interpreted
consistently, whether they are encountered in a criminal or
noncriminal context.188
Therefore, the rule of lenity requires the statute to be viewed
favorably to the developer. Thus, “[s]uch a construction authorizes the
maintenance of deposits required by both subsection (1) and
subsection (2) of Section 718.202 in a single escrow account. The
buyers’ claims against North Carillon for the maintenance of deposits
in a single escrow account, therefore were properly dismissed by the
trial court.”189
D.

Significance of Judge Canady’s Ruling

The 6-1 decision that Florida law does not require
maintenance of separate escrow bank accounts for the deposits of
preconstruction buyers was a significant victory for developers
statewide that contracted before July 1, 2010. Amazingly, this was the
first time in Florida that a court applied the rule of lenity to a civil
case.190
The importance of the decision lies with the fact that this case
could lead to hundreds of similar lawsuits throughout Florida, with
buyers “seeking to recover hundreds of millions of dollars of deposits
by suing to rescind preconstruction contracts following the housing
bust.”191 Although the retroactive issue of Section 718.202(11) was
186

Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.021 (2014).
North Carillon, 135 So. 3d at 279.
188
Id. at 279-80.
189
Id. at 280.
190
Caren Berg, Florida Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Developers
Regarding Handling of Escrow Funds, YAHOO FINANCE (Feb. 3, 2014, 12:19 PM)
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/florida-supreme-court-rules-favor-171909953.html
191
Id.
187
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not settled officially by the Court, it clearly indicated that the Third
District Court of Appeals decision violating retroactivity would have
been correct.
E.

South Florida’s Second Condo Boom: Reaction to the Bubble
Burst and Section 718.202

South Florida’s commercial real estate was hit particularly
hard when the last condo boom crashed. When Lehman Brothers’
failure brought the entire financial system of the United States to the
brink of an economic meltdown, “more than 60,000 condo units were
on the resale market in the fourth quarter of 2008.”192 Swire, the
developer from Double AA, was part of a Miami market with 22,000
residential units for sale in 2008.193 Miami became known as the
poster child for speculation and overbuilding when the condo bubble
burst.194
One of the main contributing reasons to South Florida’s crisis
was that buyers who used Section 718.202 to void their
preconstruction condo contracts when prices tanked, then looked to
real estate brokerage firms to get back their twenty percent
deposits.195 To make matters worse, developers who had an
oversupply of units went to these brokerage firms demanding that
commission advances be returned for deals that fell apart.196 Steven
Owens, president of Swire, acknowledged that many thought the
oversupply would last for decades and effectively crippled South
Florida’s commercial real estate market.197

192

Peter Zalewski, Lenders Provide Nearly $900 Million in Financing for New
26,
2013),
South
Florida
Condo
Projects, CBC MIAMI (Aug
http://cbcamiami.com/lenders-provide-900-million-in-new-construction-loans/.
193
Greg Allen, In Miami, A New Condo Boom Revives Hopes of Housing
(Jan.
22,
2013,
3:24
AM),
Recovery.,
NPR
http://www.npr.org/2013/02/22/172602696/in-miami-a-new-condo-boom-reviveshopes-of-housing-recovery.
194
Martha Brannigan, ISG: Selling the Dream of a Miami Condo, MIAMI
HERALD,
Oct.
27,
2013,
available
at
Access
World
News
201310270000KNRIDDERFLMIAMIH_d364207718ce7f752a187ff7e95a6832.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
ALLEN, supra note 193.
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V. WHY DID THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE CRASH HIT SOUTH
FLORIDA SO MUCH HARDER THAN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY?
After the housing market crashed in 2007, many predicted the
commercial real estate market would face a similar fate.198 In 2010,
the same year Section 718.202 was amended, Elizabeth Warren’s
Congressional Oversight Panel predicted foreclosures, loan defaults
and a national crisis of disastrous proportions.199
However, on average nationally, the crash never reached the
meltdown that the housing market experienced.200 According to NinHai Tseng of CNNMoney, even though prices across the commercial
real estate market declined nearly 40% during the housing crisis, it
never reached the foreclosure and default scale of the housing
market.201 Nationally, commercial real estate, including the market for
hotels, malls, apartments, and office buildings,202 was not nearly as
overbuilt as the residential market. However, South Florida was one
of the few exceptions to the minimized commercial downward spiral.
While struggling commercial owners “enjoyed continuous flow of
income by way of rents from tenants,”203 South Florida had an
oversupply from new condominiums and thousands of empty units.204
Tseng also commented that national attention was taken away
from the commercial sector because so many workers, materials, and
resources were devoted to home construction.205 Additionally, even
though construction projects picked up after the housing bubble burst,
this increase did not last long because the financial crisis occurred
shortly thereafter.206
In South Florida, it appears the opposite of Warren’s and
198

Nin-Hai Tseng, Why The Commercial Real Estate Crash Never Came,
(Sept.
23,
2013,
3:44
PM),
FORTUNE
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/09/23/commercial-real-estate-hilton/.
199
WARREN, supra note 27, at 138.
200
TSENG, supra note 198.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
See Peter Zalewski, Six Years After Condo Crash, 100 New Towers
Proposed, THE SUNNY ISLES BEACH REPORTER (Feb. 9, 2013),
http://sibreporter.net/2013/02/miami-herald-six-years-after-condo-crash-100-newtowers-proposed/; see Peter Zalewski, Lenders Provide Nearly $900 Million in
Financing for New South Florida Condo Projects, CBC MIAMI (Aug 26, 2013),
http://cbcamiami.com/lenders-provide-900-million-in-new-construction-loans/.
205
TSENG, supra note 198.
206
Id. Supported by comments from Susan Wachter, real estate and finance
professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business.
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Tseng’s predictions and analyses actually occurred. As stated above,
South Florida (most notably Miami) was the global poster child for
speculation and overbuilding and represented one of the worst
commercial real estate disasters of any city in the country. What is
surprising however, is how quickly and incredibly strong the market
has bounced back. The nightmare years of 2007-10 now feel like a
distant memory as South Florida’s commercial market has rebounded
with immense strength and on the surface, has the opportunity to alter
the landscape of the entire region.
A.

South Florida’s New Commercial Real Estate Boom – BuyerDeposit Model

The structure of financing the commercial real estate industry
in South Florida during the late 2000s was similar to that of the rest of
the country. Generally
[t]he structure of the industry and the manner in which
commercial real estate development occurs involves a
series of financing efforts at each stage of the life of
the development. In a typical scenario, the life cycle of
most large commercial real estate projects starts with a
promoter who forms a limited partnership. With
relatively little in the way of capital as a percentage of
the total funding required to build out the project, the
promoter secures an option to buy land. Using
appraisals based on comparables of developed
properties and with capital raised from limited
partners, the real estate developer obtains interim
financing to begin construction of the development.
During the construction phase, the promoter is lining
up longer term financing based on projections of future
cash flows from the project.207
However, new condominium construction planned for Miami
and the rest of South Florida has seen such a large resurgence recently
because of an innovative approach to preconstruction financing. As
reported in the Miami Herald in 2012, “banks are mostly still balking
at lending for condominium construction, though much of the glut
from the last debacle has been absorbed sooner than predicted.”208
207

Robert J. Lahm, Jr., Charles R.B. Stowe, Patrick R. Geho, Commercial Real
Estate (CRE) Market – Next Meltdown or Recovery on the Way?, 4 RES. IN BUS. &
ECON. J., Aug. 2011, at 1, 5-6.
208
Martha Brannigan, New Condo Financing Model Has Merit – and Risk,
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Despite the reticence of banks, brokerage firms and developers are
confident that this time around South Florida real estate is on firmer
ground because developers are now persuading “cash-rich buyers,
mostly foreigners, to plunk down big deposits on preconstruction
deals for cutting-edge towers that are touted as nothing less than
transformational.”209
Developers and brokers are confident that South Florida real
estate can avoid the catastrophic oversupply of unsold condominium
units from the past. One reason is that there is a new method of
preconstruction financing that has gained popularity throughout the
South Florida market. Currently driving the new boom is what has
been dubbed as the “buyer-deposit model”210:
Under that approach, condo buyers—mostly cash-rich
foreigners looking for an investment or a second
home—pony up big deposits on pre-construction units,
typically upwards of 50 percent of the purchase price.
(For Apogee Beach and MyBrickell, buyers agreed to
pay a whopping 80 percent of the purchase price in a
series of payments before closing.) Developers
generally can use the buyers’ deposits to finance
construction, except for the 10 percent that is
escrowed.211
Argentinian developer Jose Luis Melo, who runs the Melo
Group real estate company, takes credit for bringing this commonly
utilized South American model to Miami and the rest of South
Florida.212 Melo says that when Miami’s market imploded, he decided
to implement the model most developers use in his native
Argentina.213
This model has proved sufficiently popular even though the
unit buyers become mere unsecured creditors for the creation of the

MIAMI
HERALD
(Oct.
27,
2013),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/09/03/2983520/new-condo-financing-modelhas.html [hereinafter Brannigan, New Condo Financing].
209
Id.
210
Martha Brannigan, ISG: Selling the Dream of a Miami Condo, Miami
Herald (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/10/27/3711974/isgselling-the-dream-of-a-miami.html [hereinafter Brannigan, ISG].
211
Id.; FLA. STAT. §718.202 (2014).
212
Kevin Gray, Miami Real Estate Revival a Boon for Latin American
Developers, Reuters (Mar. 10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/10/ususa-housing-miami-idUSBRE92905O20130310.
213
Id.
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condominiums.214 The risk facing buyers in this emerging
construction model is considerable. It has become the buyers, not the
banks215 who are in danger of losing their money because these
interest-free deposits mean that if a project fails, other creditors will
have priority over their unsecured deposits. Any bank that lends to a
developer traditionally requires collateral and “[c]onstruction
companies also usually have priority rights to get paid.”216 This leaves
condominium buyers low on the priority totem pole should the
developer fail to complete a project.
Another risk inherent in this new-to-South-Florida-model is
that buyers do not receive a mortgage or any type of collateral while
making the 50%-80% down payments. Thomas Lehman, a bankruptcy
attorney with Levin Kellogg Lehman Schneider + Grossman notes,
“[y]ou’re putting a lot of money at risk with a developer on a promise
to complete the project. You’re not getting a mortgage and you’re not
getting collateral. You’re getting a promise.”217
William Sklar, a real-estate attorney at Akerman Senterfitt,
also commented on this new South American-influenced model:
“Banks lending for construction typically track a project’s progress
before disbursing each stage of funding. But with the new model,
buyers are placing more trust in the developer. ‘Who is looking at
how funds are being spent? No one really is doing that.’”218
Further criticism of the buyer-deposit model is that these huge
interest-free deposits will scare away many potential buyers, leaving
builders unable to sell the thousands of units left over from the market
crash, as well as units in new buildings relying on this method to
finance construction. Developers, however, welcome customers who
are willing to pay up to an 80% deposit before the first shovel of dirt
even moves. According to David Martin, president and chief
operating officer at Terra Group, “[t]he supply of buyers is less, but
they’re more real. They’re not relying on debt.”219 Because of the
large deposits, buyers are less likely to walk away, thus avoiding
many of the Section 718.202 issues from the past. Unlike the
preconstruction model that led Miami to be known as the poster child
of America’s housing bust,220 when these new buildings begin

214
215
216
217
218
219
220

Tseng, supra note 198.
Brannigan, New Condo Financing, supra note 208.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N. Carillon, supra note 177.
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construction, they will already be fully funded.
Amid plans to construct new buildings throughout South
Florida and attempts to finally sell the thousands of empty units, a
lingering question still remains: If banks are balking at funding
developments because of looming memories of the 2008 commercial
real estate crash, who are these cash-rich buyers fueling the latest
South Florida condominium boom?
B.

How Latin America Saved Miami

The revival of South Florida’s commercial real estate market,
with Miami at the epicenter, actually began during the crisis as
thousands of Miami’s condominiums sat empty.221 Despite the
rampant vacancies, Melo, the pioneer of the buyer-deposit model,
decided to buy land for $1.4 million in downtown Miami in late
2010.222 Although there was harsh criticism of his $1.4 million
purchase, all 98 condominiums sold in just five months, with
construction starting only a few months later.223 The condominiums
were amazingly snapped up by wealthy Latin Americans who have
long invested in South Florida property. This time, however, the
resurgence in Miami is getting an extra lift from South American
developers like Melo. “Increasingly, developers from Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela are getting into the act to meet demand
from Latin Americans looking for a stable place to park their money
and to make extra income through rentals.”224
How do developers sell yet to be built condominiums to
buyers who do not even live in the United States? Today, technology
and sales offices play an important role in the buyer-deposit model, as
“snazzy websites and a glossy brochure”225 are utilized to create 3D
visuals of the building, including individual units, to present to
potential buyers. Also, the Latin American developers have strong ties
to foreign real estate brokers that serve as the backbone for many
businesses looking to sell proposed condominium units to foreign
investors.226
Another reason the Latin American market has become so
221

Gray, supra note 212.
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. (Peter Zalewski, principle of real estate consultancy Condo Vultures
describes the Latin American presence as a “coming of age period” in construction
and development.).
225
Brannigan, ISG, supra note 194.
226
Id.
222
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much more involved in South Florida commercial real estate stems
from recent currency devaluations in Brazil, Argentina and
Venezuela.227 Especially in Argentina, the weakening peso and
increasing inflation (resulting from its $100 billion default in 2001)
propelled many Argentines to move their money to the United
States.228 There are few safe investments left in the country, and
foreign properties allow Argentines a place to put their savings and an
opportunity to make extra money through rentals.229 As Eduardo
Blasco, a financial consultant in Buenos Aires notes, “Argentines
don’t want any more Argentine risk.”230
In Brazil, housing prices are extremely high and as of early
2012, the Brazilian Real goes “roughly twice as far. . .as it did 10
years ago.”231 Condominiums in Rio de Janeiro are in excess demand
and are going for $2,000 to $3,000 per square foot in the high-end
areas compared to about $1,000 to $2,000 in Miami.232 So,
considering the strengthening Real and high prices in Brazil, a
Brazilian buyer looking to buy a Miami condominium for $2 million
would have been looking at spending $4 million on that same condo
just ten years ago.
While South Florida is attractive to many groups of people
such as retirees and snowbirds, the wealthy Latin Americans are the
ones providing the jumpstart to the commercial real estate market. So
well known is the Latin attraction to Miami that in real estate circles,
the city has earned the nickname “the Capital of Latin America.”233 In
2012, Argentines passed Brazilians to become the most active Latin
American group buying real estate in South Florida, quickly renaming
North Beach “Little Buenos Aires.”234 Latin Americans understand
227

Gray, supra note 212.
Alexei Barrionuevo, Argentines Turn Cash Into Condos in Miami, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/realestate/argentinesturn-cash-into-condos-in-miami.html?_r=0.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Jason Margolis, Brazilian Home Buyers Spark a Miami Comeback, The
World (Feb. 22, 2012), http://pri.org/stories/2012-02-22/brazilian-home-buyersspark-miami-comeback (quoting Daniel Ickowicz, the director of sales for Elite
International Realty).
232
Alexander Britell, How Latin America Saved Miami, The Real Deal (Nov.
3, 2012), http://therealdeal.com/issues_articles/how-latin-america-saved-miami/.
233
Luis Iglesias, Latin America Real Estate Developers Thrive in Miami,
Miami
Real
Est.
News
Blog
(Mar.
21,
2013),
http://miamirealestatenewsblog.com/latin-american-real-estate-investment-inmiami/.
234
Id.
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the popularity of Miami investments and as condominium prices
slowly continue to rise in the area, they are hoping to make a large
chunk of money. In 2012, according to a survey conducted by Florida
Realtors, “35 percent of all foreign buyers in Florida have come from
Latin American countries–the largest buying bloc of any region
coming to South Florida.”235 This buying power has greatly
contributed to the $10.7 billion that foreign investors have brought in
Florida sales from 2011 to 2012.236
Without the Latin American influx in South Florida, there
would likely still be tremendous oversupply from 2008. In 2013, of
the 22,000 residential units unsold in Miami, amazingly only about
12,000 remain.237 In addition, less than 2,000 units are unsold from “a
pool of nearly 49,000 units created since 2003 in South Florida’s
largest coastal markets of Greater Downtown Miami, South Beach,
Sunny Isles Beach, Hollywood, Hallandale Beach, Fort Lauderdale,
Boca Raton and West Palm Beach as of June 30 [2013].”238
C.

Lenders Are Opening the “Financing Spigot”239 in Miami-Dade,
Broward and Palm Beach

It appears that in the past 20 or so months, banks have begun
to recognize the potential success of the buyer-deposit model. As
developers sell out units using buyer deposits between 30% and 80%
to cover the cost of financing, banks are becoming more active in
financing condo projects because “[t]he return of financing for
proposed condo towers is significant.”240
Banks seem fairly confident in the buyer-deposit model, as
lenders have provided nearly $900 million (as of August 25, 2013) in
financing to condominium developers for more than 150 proposed
projects in South Florida.241 The lending provides developers the
235

Britell, supra note 232.
Id.
237
Greg Allen, In Miami, A New Condo Boom Revives Hopes of Housing
Recovery,
Nat’l
Pub.
Radio
(Feb
22,
2013),
http://www.npr.org/2013/02/22/172602696/in-miami-a-new-condo-boom-reviveshopes-of-housing-recovery (quoting Stephen Owens, president of Swire).
238
Peter Zalewski, Lenders Provide Nearly $900 Million in Financing for New
South Florida Condo Projects, Miami Herald (Aug. 25, 2013),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/08/25/3583603/lenders-provide-nearly-900million.html.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
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ability to purchase the actual development sites as well as begin
construction on the towers, examples of which include: $160 million
for the planned Mansions at Acqualina tower in Sunny Isles Beach,
$105 million for the planned Echo Aventura Project with two towers
in Northeast Miami-Dade County, and $50 million for the proposed
BeachWalk condo-hotel tower in Hallendale Beach.242 Two banks that
have financed the most include Alabama’s Regions Bank, with nearly
$250 million allocated, and New York City’s NorthStar Realty
Finance Corp, with more than $125 million in financing.243
However, the lending of these banks has been overshadowed
by a $214 million loan that New York/South Florida based Dezer
Development closed with Wells Fargo for construction of the Porsche
Design Tower Miami at 18555 Collins Avenue in Sunny Isles
Beach.244 This is one of the largest single loans for any construction
project in the Southeast United States, and features 132 units—twothirds of which have already been secured, resulting in $535 million
in sales.245 Dezer expects the remaining units to be sold by the end of
the year in a building that features a “one-of-a-kind automobile lift
system, which will allow owners to park their vehicles directly next to
their units.”246
Perhaps more good news stemming from the implementation
of the buyer-deposit model is that the return of financing for proposed
condominium towers may lead to a reduction in the percentage of
buyer deposits.247 Any sort of reduction would widen the pool of
potential buyers who, previously, were much more afraid than their
foreign counterparts to “entrust developers with such large financial
commitments.”248
D.

Risks of Using the South American Playbook

The risk involved with the new condominium preconstruction
model has shifted from the banks to the buyers, who are in danger of
huge losses if a building goes south and fails to close. Unlike many
242

Id.
Id.
244
Oscaro Pedro Musibay, Porsche Design Condo Gets Record $214 Million
FLA.
BUS.
J.
(Sept.
23,
2013),
Financing,
S.
http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/news/2013/09/25/porsche-design-condogets-record-214m.html?page=all.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Zalewski, supra note 238.
248
Id.
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American buyers, Latin Americans are comfortable with big deposits
because they are customary in their home countries.249 These
Argentines, Brazilians, Colombians, Venezuelans and others view
Miami as a solid long-term investment because of the City’s
perception as one of the cosmopolitan capitals of the world.250
What is interesting about these payment deposits is that they
are similar to an unsecured loan.251 If a project fails, then other
creditors—such as banks or construction companies—have priority
over unit buyers and have greater rights to get paid.252 However, even
more interesting is the fact that South American investors do not seem
to be affected by this risk. In their home countries, very high interest
rates and “historically high inflation make financing riskier and more
expensive,” but those issues are not at the forefront of Miami and
United States investing.253
In terms of risk in the eyes of developers, the Miami today is
not the Miami of the early 2000s, and this new strategy has been
viewed as necessary to prevent speculators from coming back to the
city to flip apartments like they did in the past.254 While the supply of
buyers may be less, they are more real because the high payment
deposits weed out speculators who were the main cause of the
problems in the previous condominium boom.255
Developers realize this new financing strategy is great for
business because of the reduced risk they must incur, but there have
been some critics of the model. For example, “it has motivated
developers to build more towers for the rich–mostly with foreigners in
mind, though they rarely want to admit that–and not for middle-class
Americans who simply cannot afford the big down payments.”256 The
problem here is that towers for the rich could keep lenders from
returning to traditional lending practices as well.257
Another issue centers on the fact that developers may decide
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to cut corners because they are not worrying about required
inspections from banks during construction to ensure that all standards
are being met.258 With banks out of the way, developers do not have
to stress about that pressure.
In the end however, it is the buyers with the “nonrefundable
skin in the game,” and they bear the most risk.259 Still, these investors
are not uneducated, and will not sink their money into projects that
they believe will fail, particularly where they are guaranteed by no
more than a handshake and a promise.
E. Is the Latest Condominium Boom Sustainable?
One possible issue to watch for in the future is if “lenders start
to loosen their purse strings to allow for less equity and high leverage
in developments.”260 Also, while it was noted above that a reduction
in the percentage required for buyer deposits would bring in a larger
amount of buyers, developers still need to be wary “because the less
skin in the game, the more likely a buyer will choose not to close.”261
However, if lenders, developers, and buyers have long enough
memories to avoid creating another boom-and-bust condo cycle, then
we can look forward to the completion of immaculate projects in the
future. Buildings such as Porsche Design Tower Miami, and a
visionary $10 billion project in Bayfront predicting development by
2020 will help redesign the entire landscape of South Florida.
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